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PUTTING THE SUBSTANCE BACK INTO THE
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
ABSTRACT
The foreign tax credit, which saves U.S. taxpayers from paying both
foreign and domestic income taxes on the same income, is critical to
facilitating global commerce. However, as savvy taxpayers discover
increasingly complicated ways to abuse the foreign tax credit regime through
the structuring of business transactions, courts have become increasingly
skeptical of the validity of those transactions. Using the economic substance
doctrine, a common law doctrine codified in 2010 at I.R.C. § 7701(o), courts
will disallow tax benefits stemming from a transaction that is not profitable
absent its tax benefits, and which the taxpayer had no incentive to undertake
except for its tax benefits. While the statute seems clear on its face, there is a
deep split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals over what constitutes the exact
transaction to be analyzed. In Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v.
Commissioner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that,
while a court will not consider a foreign tax credit received as profit arising
from a transaction, it will also deduct the costs of paying foreign taxes as a
cost of the transaction. Conversely, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits consider tax credits earned as profit and subtract the
costs of paying foreign taxes when applying the doctrine. This Note argues
that the Second Circuit decision renders taxpayers all but powerless to
survive economic substance scrutiny, and that the Supreme Court should
create bright-line precedent defining what constitutes a transaction for
economic substance purposes, more closely adhering to the Fifth and Eighth
Circuit approaches.
INTRODUCTION
Double taxation, the idea that a taxpayer would pay taxes on the same
income more than once, seems to be inherently unfair. United States
taxpayers conducting business in foreign countries and incurring tax
obligations on income derived therefrom are especially susceptible to this
kind of predicament. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code contains protections
against “the evil of double taxation.”1 The relevant provisions, enacted in
I.R.C. §§ 901–909, constitute what is known as the “foreign tax credit
regime.”2 These provisions provide, among other things, that a U.S. taxpayer
that pays income taxes in another country will receive a tax credit against its
U.S. tax liability for the amount of foreign taxes paid.3 Hence, foreign tax

1. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Burnet v.
Chi. Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7 (1932)).
2. See id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 901–909 (2012).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 901–909.
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credits are important to any taxpayer conducting business overseas, because
they save the taxpayer from unfair double taxation.
However, while the statute is meant to facilitate global commerce,4 some
taxpayers have found ways to abuse the system through disingenuous
transactions meant only to create tax benefits and nothing more.5 To counter
these abuses, the courts have adopted a test, the economic substance doctrine,
to root out sham transactions, and they will disallow any foreign tax benefits
that would normally occur in such a situation.6 Courts have established that
“[a] transaction is a sham if it is fictitious or if it has no business purpose or
economic effect other than the creation of tax deductions.”7 In other words,
the transaction must have economic substance.
Under the economic substance doctrine, courts look at: (1) whether the
transaction could objectively have turned a profit that was not a tax benefit
(the objective prong);8 and (2) whether there was “a subjective non-tax
business purpose for entering in the transaction” (the subjective prong).9
Some courts have applied the doctrine loosely,10 but all iterations center
around these two prongs. Congress codified the economic substance doctrine
as a part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act in 2010.11 The
statute, codified as I.R.C. § 7701(o), is titled, “Clarification of economic
substance doctrine,” and it provides for substantially the same two-prong
inquiry that some courts previously utilized under the common law.12
On September 9, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
handed down an opinion that significantly impacted the landscape
surrounding foreign tax credits and their permissibility in tax-structured
transactions. In Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. Commissioner (BNY), the
Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that tax benefits generated
by an elaborate circular trust were inapplicable, because the transaction had
no economic substance.13 The Second Circuit held, among other things, that
“foreign taxes are economic costs and should . . . be deducted when
calculating pre-tax profit” under the objective prong of the economic
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 118.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
Id. at 469–70.
DeMartino v. Comm’r, 862 F.2d 400, 406 (2d Cir. 1988).
Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The Court’s conclusion that Gilman
lacked a business purpose . . . reflected the fact that the tax benefits were the motivation: once the
documentation established those benefits, Gilman was unconcerned about residual value. Even if
the residual value was zero, the tax benefits made the arrangement attractive.”).
9. Id. at 147–48.
10. See, e.g., Altria Grp., v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 2d 259, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
11. See Richard M. Lipton, New Guidance Sheds Light on Economic Substance Doctrine and
Related Penalties, 121 J. TAX’N 266, 268 (2014).
12. The codified economic substance provides that a transaction has economic substance only
if (A) “the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the
taxpayer’s economic position,” and (B) “the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal
income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.” I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012).
13. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2015).
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substance doctrine, while any tax benefits from the suspect tax credits should
not be counted toward the transaction’s profitability.14
The transaction at issue in this case, a loan product called Structured
Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities (STARS), was the result of an
elaborate transaction between a U.S. company, Bank of New York (BNY),
and a U.K. company, Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays).15 Through the
transaction, BNY sought to avoid paying taxes in the United Kingdom,
receive foreign tax credits in the United States, and benefit from loan
proceeds, all at the same time. Barclays loaned $1.5 billion to BNY through
a series of transactions involving BNY and its subsidiaries.16 Ultimately, the
money was invested into a trust, which BNY created prior to effectuating the
transaction.17 The trustee was a U.K. based subsidiary of BNY, subject to
U.K. tax law.18 When dividends were paid out to the U.K. trustee, BNY
covered the resulting U.K. tax liabilities;19 however, because Barclays
received tax credits under U.K. tax law, it returned half of the resulting tax
spread to BNY.20 Effectively, BNY paid the full amount of U.K. taxes,
received U.S. tax credits for that whole amount, and was subsequently
reimbursed by Barclays for half the U.K. taxes it paid.21 In short, BNY
circulated money through the STARS structure, incurred heavy foreign tax
burdens, and used the resulting tax benefits under U.S. tax law to offset its
U.S. tax bill.
The issue of how to analyze transactions under the objective and
subjective prongs of the economic substance doctrine is not new and presents
difficulties in its application to international business transactions. The
Second Circuit acknowledged that its holding in BNY diverged from holdings
in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits on the issue of calculating profitability in
economic substance analyses.22 In Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit held that “[i]f the effects of [a] tax law . . .
are to be accounted for when they subtract from a transaction’s net cash flow,
tax law effects should be counted when they add to cash flow.”23 Under this
less rigorous analysis, the Fifth Circuit found that a transaction Compaq
entered into met the requirements of the economic substance doctrine.24 In
IES Industries v. United States, the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 124.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15, 16 (2013).
See id. at 18.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 42 n.14.
Id.
Id.
See generally Compaq Comput. Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir.
2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
23. Compaq Comput. Corp., 277 F.3d at 785.
24. Id. at 788.

472

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 11

its broader calculation of profitability, holding that the transaction at issue in
that case needed to be viewed as a whole.25
The problem with the codified economic substance doctrine today, as this
Note highlights, is that Circuits are applying the doctrine inconsistently,
counteracting the apparent goal of its codification.26 The ramification is that
decisions on whether tax benefits will be allowed where the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) challenges a transaction under the economic substance doctrine
are unpredictable. Furthermore, as this Note argues, the current, stringent
application of the codified doctrine renders it almost impossible for the
taxpayer to overcome economic substance scrutiny.
This Note argues that, while the Second Circuit was ultimately correct in
its BNY holding that STARS-like transactions do not have economic
substance,27 it erred in bifurcating the transaction at issue. Additionally, this
Note argues that the Second Circuit should have considered the foreign tax
benefits BNY received as profit from the transaction, because Congress
intended the courts to formulate a unified method of applying the economic
substance doctrine that comports with the statutory intent behind permitting
tax benefits. Thus, the Supreme Court should solve the problems with
application of the economic substance doctrine by crafting a bright-line rule
in accordance with these arguments.
Part I of this Note gives an in-depth explanation of the complicated
transaction and proceedings of BNY. Parts II and III explain the history of
economic substance jurisprudence, both before and after codification of the
economic substance doctrine. Part III further explains why the issues
surrounding the doctrine have persisted even after its codification. Part IV
argues the Second Circuit erred in bifurcating the $1.5 billion Barclays loan
from the STARS transaction in BNY, because the Court relied on tenuously
connected case law, thereby vitiating the concept of two-pronged economic
substance scrutiny, and producing precedent that will unduly militate against
taxpayers in the future. Part V argues the Second Circuit erred in discounting
the tax benefits attributed to the STARS transaction as separate and apart
from the transaction when, in reality, they contributed to its objective
profitability, which undermines the purpose of the foreign tax credit regime
and creates a windfall for the IRS and the government. Finally, Part VI
explains how Congress invited the courts to use common law application of
the doctrine to allow statutorily intended tax benefits and disallow unintended
benefits. Without the Supreme Court’s intervention, this goal cannot be
achieved.

25. IES Indus., Inc., 253 F.3d at 356.
26. Compare Compaq Comput. Corp., 277 F.3d at 785 (applying a more taxpayer-friendly

economic substance scrutiny), with Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 140 T.C. at 35 n.9 (disagreeing with
the Compaq court and applying a more stringent version of economic substance scrutiny).
27. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2015).
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I. THE PRINCIPAL CASE: BNY
BNY was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Bank of New York
Company, Inc. (BNY Parent), when BNY Parent merged with Mellon
Financial Corp.28 BNY transacted business globally, and in 2001 agreed to
enter into a STARS transaction with U.K.-based Barclays.29 The term of the
transaction lasted from 2001 until 2006.30 For the years 2001 and 2002, as a
result of the STARS transaction, BNY enjoyed foreign tax credits in the
amounts of $98,607,973 and $100,285,767 each respective year.31 Barclays
and a tax advisory firm, KPMG, enticed BNY to enter into the STARS
transaction to obtain a low-cost loan in the amount of about $1.5 billion.32
Barclays was to serve as the U.K. counterparty, which would achieve the
desired tax benefits that allowed Barclays to loan the money at a low rate.33
The steps to achieve the transaction occurred as follows: First, BNY
contributed $6.46 billion worth of assets to BNY REIT Holdings, Inc.34 Next,
BNY organized BNY Investment Holdings LLC (InvestCo), and REIT
Holdings capitalized the company with $10.409 billion in assets.35 Then,
BNY organized BNY Delaware Funding, LLC (DelCo), and InvestCo
capitalized DelCo with $9.243 billion in assets.36 In return, DelCo issued two
classes of stock to InvestCo, which effectively gave InvestCo all voting rights
and the right to nearly all asset distributions DelCo would make.37 Then,
BNY formed the BNY STARS Trust (the Trust).38 InvestCo transferred the
remaining $1.2 billion in STARS assets to the Trust. Finally, BNY formed
BNY NewCo Funding, LLC (NewCo), and gave InvestCo a complete
ownership interest in NewCo through a series of exchanges.39
After the formation of these companies, Barclays made a series of
transactions, which had the effect of loaning BNY $1.5 billion at LIBOR 40
plus twenty basis points.41 To give the STARS transaction its intended
purpose, BNY and its counterparty Barclays replaced the U.S. trustee of the
Trust with the Bank of New York Trust and Depository Company Limited, a
U.K. trustee that paid U.K. taxes, not U.S. taxes.42 Importantly, BNY

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 140 T.C. at 17.
Id. at 16–17.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 110.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 140 T.C. at 29–30.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
InvestCo held 99% of the DelCo shares. Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
“LIBOR” stands for “London Interbank Offering Rate.” Id. at 19 n.5.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 25–26.
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completely owned the U.K. trustee, which was a BNY subsidiary.43 Through
a series of transactions, BNY accelerated the Trust’s generation of tax
obligations by creating lump-sum payments from the Trust, resulting in $402
million of taxable income in the United Kingdom.44
Due to the nature of this transaction, and its interaction with U.K. tax
law, Barclays received a tax credit for 22% of its 30% tax rate, among other
tax deductions.45 Regardless of the amount owed, BNY agreed to pay the
total tax liability Barclays incurred, for which BNY then received a tax credit,
as well as a reimbursement for half of the tax amount from Barclays.46 Thus,
economically, the transaction served both Barclays and BNY well, especially
given the foreign tax credits BNY claimed it was entitled to. However, the
IRS found that there were tax deficiencies totaling approximately $215
million in BNY’s federal income tax for the years 2001 and 2002, as a result
of the claimed foreign tax credits.47 BNY contended that it was entitled to the
tax credits, and thus there were no deficiencies in its tax liabilities.48 The Tax
Court ruled against BNY and the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
decision.49
The Tax Court conducted an analysis of the case under the
aforementioned economic substance doctrine, and conducted a bifurcation of
BNY’s transaction.50 The Tax Court held that the STARS transaction lacked
economic substance and, therefore, BNY was not entitled to claim foreign
tax credits resulting from the transaction.51 As previously discussed, the
economic substance doctrine analysis has two prongs: an objective prong
(whether there was profitability in the transaction aside from tax benefits)
and a subjective prong (whether there was a non-tax business rationale for
entering the transaction).52
First, the Tax Court concluded that under the economic substance
analysis the court ought to bifurcate the transaction and look only at the
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 28.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Each month, for
every $100 of trust income, the trust would set aside $22 to pay U.K. taxes, with $78 remaining for
distribution. Because the $78 was first transferred to Barclays’ blocked account and then back to
the trust, Barclays could treat the re-contributed $78 as a trading loss and claim a trading loss
deduction under U.K. tax law. At the 30% corporate tax rate, the deduction translated to a $23.40
reduction in Barclays’ U.K. taxes ($78 x 30%) . . . Barclays would pay the $11 tax-spread to BNY—
half the trust’s U.K. tax bill of $22. Because Barclays would deduct the cost of the tax-spread from
its U.K. corporate taxes, it gained an additional $3.30 in tax benefit ($11 x 30%). In the end, this
left Barclays with $7.70 in total tax benefit for each $100 of trust income ($15.40 minus the taxspread payment of $11, plus the tax-spread deduction of $3.30)). Id.
47. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 140 T.C. at 16.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 124.
50. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 140 T.C. at 16.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 32.
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STARS tax spread and Trust structure when determining the objective
profitability of the STARS transaction.53 Consequently, the court disregarded
the $1.5 billion Barclays loaned BNY.54 The Tax Court held that the STARS
transaction had no chance of profitability and therefore failed the objective
prong of the economic substance analysis.55 Moreover, the court disagreed
with BNY’s argument that the court should have at least looked at the income
the loan transaction generated.56
Second, the Tax Court found that the transaction did not have subjective
economic substance, because BNY had no “legitimate non-tax business
purpose for the use of the STARS structure.”57 Interestingly, having
bifurcated the transaction, the Tax Court rejected BNY’s argument that the
STARS transaction was a way to obtain a low-cost loan from Barclays.58 It
also rejected BNY’s argument that the only way Barclays would agree to the
$1.5 billion loan was if BNY also agreed to form the STARS structure.59 In
sum, through a drawn out analysis the Tax Court refused to consider any
profit that BNY might have obtained by entering into Barclay’s STARSrelated loan.60 Hence, the Tax Court found that the only motivation behind
the transaction was obtaining tax-benefits, and thus that the transaction had
no economic substance.61
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the entirety of the Tax Court’s
decision, including its bifurcation of the transaction.62 Critically, the Second
Circuit held that, “in calculating pre-tax profit, [it is appropriate] for a court
both to include the foreign taxes paid and to exclude the foreign tax credits
claimed.”63 The Second Circuit also held, in looking at the $1.5 billion loan
as a separate transaction, that the transaction did have economic substance,
and the court allowed BNY to deduct expenses paid on proceeds from that
loan.64 BNY, however, continued to insist on appeal that the only reason it
was able to obtain the loan at an affordable rate from Barclays was by
employing the STARS structure.65 That the court bifurcated the transaction
seemed unfair to BNY, because the money that BNY stood to make from the
entire transaction was income produced by the loan from Barclays.66
Moreover, the fact that the Second Circuit and the Tax Court construed the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 33–34.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 44–46.
Id.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 122–23.
Id.
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tax payments and benefits in the least beneficial light for BNY made it
difficult for BNY to prove any kind of profitability from the transaction.67
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
DOCTRINE
The modern, common law economic substance doctrine consists of three
inquiries: (1) whether the taxpayer had a non-tax business purpose for
performing the transaction; (2) whether the transaction placed the taxpayer
in a better business position in ways other than the generation of tax benefits;
and (3) whether the tax benefits the taxpayer stands to receive are what
Congress intended.68 The courts analyzed economic substance as a common
law doctrine from the 1930s69 until it was codified into statutory law as I.R.C.
§7701(o) in 2010.70
The popular belief is that the economic substance doctrine finds its roots
in the 1935 Supreme Court case Gregory v. Helvering.71 In that case, the
taxpayer owned a corporation, which held 1000 shares of another
corporation’s stock.72 The taxpayer formed a third corporation, transferred
the 1000 shares to the newly formed entity, and liquidated that new
corporation three days later.73 The effect was that, under the applicable tax
code, the taxpayer claimed a large amount of tax-exemptions while, if she
had not pointlessly reorganized the corporations, she would have been
subject to a much higher tax liability and would have had fewer exemptions.74
Justice Sutherland opined that it is the taxpayer’s prerogative and right
to use whatever tax write-offs they are entitled to under the law, “[b]ut the
question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax
motive, was the thing which the statute intended.”75 Looking at the
transaction apart from tax benefits, the Court found that the transaction had
no business purpose, as it did not affect the taxpayer’s business other than by
creating tax deductions.76 However, some scholars have argued that the

67. The Tax Court disregarded the payments made to BNY by Barclays for the taxes (the “tax
spread”), disregarded the tax benefits BNY received as a result of those payments, and disregarded
any income to be made on the loan it received from Barclays. Id. at 121–25.
68. Jeff Rector, A Review of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 173,
174–78 (2004).
69. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935).
70. I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012).
71. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469–70.
72. Id. at 467.
73. Id. at 467–68.
74. Id. at 469–70.
75. Id.
76. Id.

2017]

Putting The Substance Back

477

Second Circuit’s earlier opinion in Gregory,77 penned by Judge Learned
Hand, is the more important and influential opinion.78
The next formative case in the history of the economic substance doctrine
was Gilbert v. Commissioner.79 Judge Hand reappears in Gilbert, this time
writing a dissenting opinion that the Supreme Court would later adopt.80 In
Hand’s Gilbert dissent, he shifts the test for economic substance from a
question of law, as it was in Gregory,81 to a question of fact.82 The Gilbert
economic substance analysis asks, then, whether the transaction will
“appreciably affect [the taxpayer’s] beneficial interest,” apart from providing
a tax benefit.83 In other words, the question Gilbert asks is whether a taxpayer
hoped to get anything out of the transaction at issue aside from tax benefits.84
This differs significantly from Gregory, as the burden shifted to the taxpayer
to show that there was some hope of profitability in the transaction, which is
one of the current economic substance doctrine prongs.85 The Supreme Court
adopted Hand’s Gilbert test in the 1960 case Knetsch v. United States.86
However, it was not until 1978 that the Supreme Court formally adopted
the modern economic substance doctrine.87 In Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, Frank Lyon entered into a sale-leaseback agreement in which it
bought a building from Worthen Bank, with the express agreement that it
would lease the building back to Worthen.88 Frank Lyon was able to claim
tax deductions from depreciation on the building, interests it paid on
construction loans, as well as other expenditures.89 However, it also stood to
profit from the transaction, because it over-paid for the building by $500,000
more than the mortgage financing, claiming it was essentially an
investment.90 According to Frank Lyon, it would receive a rate of return on
the investment of six percent.91 The IRS disallowed the tax benefits, claiming
that the transaction was a sham and could have been completed as a simple

77. See generally Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
78. See, e.g., Rector, supra note 68, at 175 (arguing that Judge Learned Hand’s opinion is now

the most influential and most quoted in modern economic substance doctrine opinions); see also
William J. Kolarik II & Stephen N.J. Wlodychak, The Economic Substance Doctrine in Federal
and State Taxation, 67 TAX L. 715, 716–17 (2014) (arguing that Judge Learned Hand is responsible
for developing the modern economic substance known today).
79. See generally Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
80. See generally Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
81. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935).
82. See Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 78, at 741.
83. Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 411.
84. Id.
85. See generally Gregory, 293 U.S. at 465; see also I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (2012).
86. See generally Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
87. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978).
88. See id. at 564–67.
89. See id. at 567.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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financing transaction.92 It further claimed that Worthen, in fact, never
relinquished ownership of the building at all.93
In upholding Frank Lyon’s right to the tax deductions, Justice Blackmun
gave explicit effect to the two-part economic substance doctrine known
today:
Where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped
solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the
Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by
the parties.94

The benefit of having a case such as Frank Lyon is that it clearly lays out
the economic substance doctrine and the inquiry it necessitates. However, the
holding in the case does not explicitly say that there is a two-prong test. After
Frank Lyon, the Circuits deeply split over how exactly to apply the economic
substance doctrine.95
First, Circuits split over whether the economic substance doctrine carries
a pass or a fail presumption.96 The Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits
presume that a suspect transaction has economic substance if only one of the
economic substance prongs have been satisfied.97 The remaining Circuits
except for the First and Fifth, which have yet to address the question directly,
presume the transaction to fail under the same circumstances.98 Second, the
Circuits have also split over whether or not Frank Lyon sets forward a twoprong inquiry to begin with.99 Some Circuits have decided that no case has
explicitly set forth today’s two-prong analysis.100 Those courts use the two
prongs of the test as factors to consider, not prongs to be satisfied.101
However, the problem with the precedent regarding the economic substance
doctrine is that a statute that is ambiguous in its own right has superseded it.
III. CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
DOCTRINE: MORE PROBLEMS
Congress codified the economic substance doctrine as a part of the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act in 2010.102 The statute, codified at
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 573.
See id.
Id. at 583–84.
See, e.g., Rector, supra note 68, at 177–78 (arguing that the Circuit Court decisions have
varied widely on how to apply the economic substance doctrine).
96. Id. at 178.
97. Id.
98. Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).
99. Rector, supra note 68, at 178.
100. See, e.g., Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 1991).
101. Id.
102. Lipton, supra note 11, at 268.
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I.R.C. § 7701(o), is titled, “Clarification of economic substance doctrine,”
and it provides for substantially the same two-prong inquiry that some
Circuits utilized under the common law.103 Importantly, the statute codified
the form of the economic substance inquiry that has a fail presumption built
into it.104
In fact, when comparing the statute with the previously discussed history
of the economic substance doctrine, one sees that Congress has enacted the
toughest possible form of the doctrine. The statute not only has the fail
presumption, but also provides the rigid two-prong test.105 It allows no wiggle
room for situations where application of the statute may allow an unfair
result. Instead, the statute makes it more difficult for a taxpayer to prove a
transaction is valid. Unfortunately, the statute does not provide clarification
as to how the courts are supposed to apply this two-prong test. Since the
codification of the economic substance doctrine, some scholars have
suggested looking to congressional intent to resolve this issue, because
Congress has not provided any express guidance as to what constitutes a
“transaction” for economic substance doctrine purposes.106
Following BNY, the statutory economic substance doctrine renders it
even more difficult for a taxpayer paying foreign taxes to prove that a
transaction has economic substance. In relevant portion, I.R.C. §
7701(o)(2)(B) provides that “[t]he Secretary shall issue regulations requiring
foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in determining pre-tax profit in
appropriate cases.”107 With this subsection, Congress seemed to be directly
targeting STARS-like transactions and wanted to make it more difficult for a
company such as BNY to be able to justify a circular transaction.108 However,
Congress failed to provide clarification in a crucial area of the economic
substance doctrine debate, which may be causing more problems than the
purported strength or weakness of the doctrine itself.
Unfortunately, Congress enacting the economic substance doctrine into
legislation has not alleviated the problems with its inconsistent application,
because the statute does not give any guidance on how courts should apply
the prongs of the test. Congress provides guidance to courts and the IRS on
how to adjudge whether a transaction has economic substance, yet does not
tell them how to decipher what the transaction to be evaluated is. While this
may not have posed a significant problem in simpler fact patterns, such as

103.
104.
105.
106.

I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2012).
Id. § 7701(o)(1)(A)–(B).
Id.
See, e.g., Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s Choices for Economic
Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX L. 551, 554–56 (2013) (arguing that the long period of legislative
history that preceded the codification of the economic substance doctrine is the key to understanding
how the doctrine is to be applied post-codification).
107. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B).
108. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 121–23 (2d Cir. 2015).
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one finds in Gregory, financial transactions have become significantly more
complicated over the years.109
Take, for example, ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,110 which is a
salient indicator of the problem with application of the economic substance
doctrine as it has developed since the 1930s. In ACM, the Colgate-Palmolive
Company (Colgate) used a Contingent Installment Sale (CINS) transaction,
to take advantage of the “ratable basis recovery rule.”111 The transaction,
marketed by Merrill-Lynch as a tax shelter, generated capital losses in excess
of $84 million, the tax deductions of which were used to offset taxes Colgate
incurred through the sale of a subsidiary company (in the amount of about
$105 million).112 Essentially, Colgate entered into a partnership with a nonU.S. taxpayer and the partners used newly formed companies to accrue debt,
contribute equity to the partnership, and circulate debts and notes, selling
assets for a loss.113 Payments were bred to come under the guise of the ratable
basis recovery rule and enabled Colgate to claim tax deductions from capital
losses.114
In reality, the shifting of funds was much more complicated, but the gist
of the entire transaction was to generate tax benefits through farming capital
losses. Both the Tax Court and the District Court denied the tax benefits,115
finding that the partnership was “not entitled to recognize a phantom loss
from a transaction that lacks economic substance.”116 In ACM, the Eleventh
Circuit looked at each step in the creation of the benefits as a series of
transactions, starting at the creation of the partnership.117 Looking at the
transaction through this lens, the court held that the funds did not actually
change the economic position of the taxpayer, and purposefully so.118 The
reasoning was clear, because ACM caused assets and debts to be sold only in
a way that made certain the principal value of the sold equity or debt
remained as close to constant as possible, so that interest payments made
from the partnership would remain fixed.119 Upon finding that ACM had not
satisfied the objective prong of the economic substance inquiry, the court
rejected ACM’s subjective prong arguments for the merits of the

109. See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (The transaction in ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner involved multiple steps, partners, and circulation of debt, notes, and
currency through a partnership.); see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 110–11 (noting
that the STARS transaction is itself convoluted).
110. See generally ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 231.
111. Kolarik II & Wlodychak, supra note 78, at 753.
112. ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 233, 243.
113. Id. at 238–42.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 244–45.
116. Id. at 245 (citing ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (T.C. 1997)).
117. Id. at 251–52.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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transaction.120 Today, the fail-presumptive nature of the statute means that
ACM would have lost solely on the objective inquiry holding.121
Transactions such as the CINS transaction at issue in ACM have become
commonplace for corporate taxpayers looking to offset their tax burdens
today.122 Although the economic substance doctrine is now codified, courts
must still decide the scope of the transaction to undergo economic substance
scrutiny. However, the problem of framing the transaction to be analyzed
persists, because courts are broadening or narrowing the scope of a
transaction in a manner that best suits the court’s respective views on the
merits of the transaction. For example, in United Parcel Service of America,
Inc. v. Commissioner the Eleventh Circuit chose to look at the suspect
transaction as the sum of its parts,123 while the Federal Circuit has held that
only the single transaction that created the tax benefits at issue is relevant to
economic substance scrutiny.124
Hence, the underlying problem surrounding the current statutory
economic substance doctrine is not that the statute is wrong or that it
inherently causes unfair results. Rather, the problem lies in determining the
transaction to be tested, most often under the objective prong of the analysis.
The result of statutory silence and disagreement among the Circuits regarding
the framing of transactions is that courts and the federal government have too
much power to invalidate transactions as they see fit. By narrowing a
transaction to only one part of what in reality is a series of connected
transactions, a court may all but explicitly preclude a taxpayer from
defending the transaction as it actually took place. For this reason, this Note
argues that it is upon the Supreme Court to supply a bright-line rule
interpreting the statutory economic substance doctrine and disallowing the
courts from narrowing their focus on a single part of a series of transactions.
BNY is a prime example of this type of narrow analysis, because the Second
Circuit narrowed the transaction in multiple ways, all of which were meant
to foist the weight of the economic substance doctrine onto the shoulders of
the taxpayer.
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Id. at 252–54.
I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 122–25 (2d Cir. 2015).
In United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, United Parcel Service (UPS)
used a foreign insurance company to avoid taxation on income it collected from its “excess value
charge program.” UPS of Am. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1016–17 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh
Circuit held in favor of UPS, stating that “the tax court’s narrow notion of ‘business purpose’ . . .
stretches the economic-substance doctrine farther than it has been stretched. A ‘business purpose’
does not mean a reason for a transaction that is free of tax considerations. Rather, a transaction has
a ‘business purpose’ . . . as long as it figures in a bona fide, profit-seeking business.” Id. at 1019.
124. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Where a company
undertook a three-step transaction to generate capital losses and offset its tax liabilities, the court
disallowed the tax benefits stating that the only portion of a transaction to be considered under
economic substance review is “the one that gave rise to the alleged tax benefit.”).
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IV. THE BURDENS OF BIFURCATION: ILL EFFECTS ON
TAXPAYERS
The Second Circuit erred in its framing of the STARS transaction in BNY
by bifurcating it into the Trust structure and the loan structure.125 The
Supreme Court should explicitly disallow such an analysis in analogous
cases. In BNY, the Second Circuit concluded that the Tax Court correctly
bifurcated the transaction.126 In refusing to view both the $1.5 billion loan
and the Trust as parts of the same series of transactions, the court focused its
economic substance inquiry solely on the Trust.127 In doing so, the court
found support in Nicole Rose Corp. v. Commissioner,128 where the Second
Circuit held that “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the transaction that
generated the claimed deductions . . . had economic substance.”129 However,
this type of bifurcation is incorrect. First, Nicole Rose is a factually different
scenario from BNY and its holding should not apply. Second, allowing a court
to pick apart a transaction eviscerates the idea of objective and subjective
prongs, which is inherent in economic substance scrutiny. Third, applying
the Second Circuit’s approach to other cases leads to clearly unfair results.
Finally, the Second Circuit did not need to bifurcate the transaction to prove
that STARS-like transactions do not pass economic substance scrutiny.
The circumstances under which the Second Circuit bifurcated the
transaction at issue in Nicole Rose are entirely different from those in BNY,
where bifurcation was improper.130 In Nicole Rose, the Second Circuit
applied the economic substance doctrine to what was essentially a saleleaseback transaction.131 In that transaction, Nicole Rose claimed
approximately $22 million in business expense deductions from a lease
involving computer equipment.132 Brussels Airport “purchased computer
equipment from ABN, a commercial Dutch bank, and then leased the
equipment back to ABN.”133 Brussels Airport funded its purchase of the
equipment through a loan from one of ABN’s subsidiary companies.134 ABN
then assigned its lease to Atrium Finis, another company, which then
subleased the equipment back to ABN once more.135 ABN prepaid $25
million on the sublease, which it placed into a trust account in order to secure
repayment on the initial loan to Brussels Airport.136
125.
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128.
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130.
131.
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Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 120–21.
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See generally Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm’r, 320 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 284.
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The parties to this transaction, with help from Nicole Rose, restructured
ABN’s leaseback into a residual value certificate.137 As a result, ABN would
make payments to Nicole Rose of 200% of the value of the equipment.138
Nicole Rose, through a series of transfers of Atrium’s rights under the lease
agreement, transferred its newfound interests to a Dutch bank, along with
$400,000 cash and some stock in an unrelated company.139 As a result, Nicole
Rose claimed a $22 million loss, which included $21,840,660 in business
expenses related to the sale-leaseback transaction.140 Nicole Rose applied the
resulting tax deductions to an unrelated sale of Quintron Corporation, which
Nicole Rose acquired shortly beforehand.141
When the IRS challenged the deductions, Nicole Rose claimed the
transaction had economic substance, and pointed to the purchase and sale of
Quintron as the source of the transaction’s profitability.142 The Second
Circuit summarily rejected this argument,143 holding that only the transaction
that generated the tax benefits (in this case the sale-leaseback) was relevant
to the economic substance inquiry. Upon comparison, it is clear that this
holding is inapplicable to the STARS transaction that took place in BNY.
In BNY, while the court and this Note have referred to the $1.5 billion
that Barclays gave BNY as a loan,144 this is simply the simpler way of
explaining the transaction. What actually took place is that Barclays
contributed the $1.5 billion to the Trust by purchasing $1.5 billion worth of
shares in the Trust.145 In fact, while Barclays promoted the STARS
transaction as a low-cost loan, it could only be achieved by routing the funds
as an investment in the STARS Trust structure.146 Whereas in Nicole Rose
the acquisition and sale of Quintron Corporation had nothing to do with the
sale-leaseback of electronics equipment to Brussels Airport,147 in BNY the
Trust had to be, and was intended to be, connected to the $1.5 billion loan
from Barclays.148 Thus, the transaction in Nicole Rose is highly
distinguishable from the transaction in BNY.
In Nicole Rose, the Second Circuit made a logical conclusion: the
point of bifurcating the sale-leaseback and refusing to consider the Quintron
sale as contributing profitability to the transaction is that the sale was not
related to the sale or lease of electronic equipment in any way. 149 However,
137.
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applying the holding in Nicole Rose to BNY, looking only at “the transaction
that generated the claimed deductions”150 must require consideration of the
$1.5 billion payment from Barclays, because it generated the tax benefits via
circulation through the Trust.151 In fact, Barclays promoted the STARS
transaction exactly as such.152
To extend the application of the Second Circuit’s holding in Nicole Rose
beyond limited and closely analogous scenarios would eviscerate the concept
of separate subjective and objective prongs of the economic substance
doctrine. The economic substance doctrine, both before153 and after154
codification, has included a subjective and objective prong. Allowing the
courts to bifurcate challenged transactions where improper or unnecessary
makes the subjective prong difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy, and renders
the objective prong actually subjective at the mercy of the court.
The subjective prong of the economic substance doctrine asks whether
or not the taxpayer had a non-tax business purpose for entering into the
transaction. In BNY, BNY argued that the STARS transaction had subjective
economic substance, as its non-tax business purpose for entering into the
transaction was to obtain a low-cost loan, as advertised by Barclays.155 Using
the holding in Nicole Rose,156 however, the Second Circuit discounted the
$1.5 billion loan from consideration under economic substance scrutiny.157
Under these circumstances, BNY had no chance to defend itself, as the only
other discernable motivation for entering the transaction related to the tax
benefits BNY received. The transaction entailed sharing tax benefits between
BNY and Barclays in exchange for the Barclays $1.5 billion contribution to
the Trust—essentially a low-interest loan.158 Because BNY could not use the
loan as its business purpose, the only other benefits it received were from the
taxes it paid.159 Hence, in broadly interpreting and applying the holding in
Nicole Rose, the Second Circuit unfairly ensured that BNY would not be able
to satisfy the subjective prong of the economic substance doctrine. Under
today’s law, BNY would have lost its appeal without further inquiry because
the codified economic substance doctrine’s two prongs must both be
satisfied.160
However, this improper application not only affects the subjective
portion of economic substance inquiry, but it also impacts the objective
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm’r, 320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2003).
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 121.
Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).

2017]

Putting The Substance Back

485

prong.161 In BNY, the Second Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that, without
considering any profit that may have resulted from investing the $1.5 billion
from Barclays, there was no way the STARS transaction could have been
profitable for BNY.162 Of course, in engaging in the STARS transaction,
which coupled the loan and benefit into one, BNY’s only method of making
a profit would be to invest the loan after it had run its course through the
Trust structure per the two parties’ STARS arrangement.163
In bifurcating away the only profitable portion of the transaction from
the portion of the transaction that generated the tax benefits, the Second
Circuit also rendered it impossible for BNY to show any kind of profitability
whatsoever. In so interpreting and applying the holding in Nicole Rose to the
STARS transaction in BNY, the Second Circuit effectively, and unfairly,
precluded BNY from offering any evidence or argument showing that the
STARS transaction had either subjective or objective economic substance.
Therefore, in light of the unfairness and inequity in bifurcating transactions
such as the STARS transaction in BNY, the Supreme Court should disallow
bifurcation except in closely analogous transactions to the one in Nicole Rose,
where the alleged separate transactions to be bifurcated were not represented
as part of one transaction and in reality bore no relation to one another.
A possible counterargument is that STARS-like transactions exploit
loopholes in the existing tax laws, and on principle therefore should not be
given the benefit of the doubt under economic substance scrutiny. However,
the economic substance doctrine does not only affect STARS transactions,
and giving the IRS a windfall through bifurcation can result in unfair
proceedings against legitimate transactions. For example, if a taxpayer enters
into a transaction for profit, but slightly modifies the transaction so as to
maximize the tax benefits the tax law affords, it seems unfair to strip such an
entity of any defense it might have under economic substance scrutiny. If
there were, in such a case, a compelling hope for profitability, under BNY
precedent a court might easily pick apart the transaction and examine solely
the portion related to tax benefits, hindering any defense of the otherwise
legitimate transaction. If a business actor can legally structure its transaction
to achieve maximum tax benefits as an addendum to its goal of earning profit,
it ought to be allowed to do so, and should not be left defenseless if the IRS
challenges the benefits.
Finally, the Second Circuit erred in going so far as to bifurcate the
STARS transaction, because STARS transactions cannot pass economic
scrutiny even when the loan portion and trust are viewed as the same
transaction. There is valuable insight into this contention in Salem Financial,
Inc. v. United States.164 In Salem, BB&T Bank and its subsidiary Salem
161.
162.
163.
164.
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Id. at 121.
Id. at 121–22.
See generally Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Financial, Inc. sued the United States in the Federal Court of Claims to
recover a tax refund the bank felt it was owed through the bank’s participation
in a STARS transaction.165 While the parties stipulated before the Federal
Circuit on appeal that the court would bifurcate the transaction for trial
purposes,166 the Court of Federal Claims considered the transaction at issue
both with and without bifurcating the transaction.167
In Salem, the IRS called into question the same type of STARS
transaction at issue in BNY.168 BB&T Bank entered into the STARS
transaction with Barclays, for a span of five years from 2002 through 2007.169
The Court of Federal Claims held that “[r]egardless of whether the Court
views the trust and the loan separately or together as one integrated STARS
transaction, the Court concludes that the entire arrangement must be
disregarded for lack of economic substance.”170 The Court of Federal Claims
then proceeded to analyze the transaction with and without bifurcating the
loan and the trust portions.171 In separating the transaction, the court found
the trust had no objective economic substance because the funds that cycled
through the trust existed before the trust was formed and were not profits
resulting from the trust.172 Barclays’ payment to BB&T of one-half of the
U.K. taxes it paid were clearly not profit, as Barclays simply reimbursed
BB&T for the taxes it paid on behalf of Barclays.173 Thus, as the court pointed
out, the only profit BB&T earned as a result came not from actual income but
from deductions resulting from taxes BB&T had, in effect, not paid.174
In analyzing the transaction without bifurcating the loan and trust
portions, however, the court concluded that much the same argument stood
true.175 Whether or not the court considered the loan as a part of the
transaction, this had no bearing on the fact that the transaction was based on
a circular cash flow.176 The court focused on BB&T’s argument that the loan,
which Barclays offered at a very low interest rate, was only possible as a
result of the tax rebates Barclays stood to receive.177 The two parties to the
transaction incurred U.K. tax liabilities by appointing a U.K. trustee and by
placing the trust payments into the U.K. trustee’s account.178 However,
immediately after this placement, BB&T removed the money to its own
165.
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custody.179 This, in the Court’s opinion, created U.K. tax liabilities on income
that was never actually earned through the STARS transaction.180 Because
this artifice was the only reason Barclays offered a low-interest loan, the court
held that that the economic reality of the entire transaction was objectively
profitless.181
Although this Note argues that the Second Circuit improperly bifurcated
the BNY STARS transaction, this is not to say that STARS transactions
themselves have economic substance. The Second Circuit could easily have
made this same argument, and invalidated the STARS transaction based on
the circular cash flows and artifice that the STARS transaction necessitated.
Therefore, this Note’s contention that STARS-like transactions do not have
economic substance is amenable to the argument that the BNY court should
not have bifurcated the transaction.
V. TAX BENEFITS AS PROFIT: BALANCING THE SCALES
Under the codified economic substance doctrine, Congress has instructed
that “[t]he Secretary shall issue regulations requiring foreign taxes to be
treated as expenses in determining pre-tax profit in appropriate cases.”182 In
BNY, decided under the common law economic substance doctrine, the
Second Circuit held that it was appropriate to treat the foreign taxes BNY
paid as expenses, but it also held that any foreign tax credits should be
discounted when calculating the pre-tax profitability of the transaction.183
However, the court also noted that its holding on this issue was at odds with
two other Circuits,184 stating that it was not bound by non-Second Circuit
precedent.185
The Second Circuit, however, went too far in discounting foreign tax
credits yet counting them as expenses when determining the profitability of
the transaction in accordance with the objective prong of the economic
substance doctrine. Foreign tax credits should be counted toward the
profitability of the transaction at issue because: (1) if not so, the purpose of
the foreign tax credit regime is thrown to the wayside; (2) declining to do so
gives the IRS even more of an advantage in a foreign tax case than it already
has; (3) it can be done in compliance with the codified economic substance
doctrine; and (4) if the credits are discounted, in conjunction with a court’s
broad power to bifurcate transactions, the economic substance doctrine is far
too powerful and the taxpayer has almost no chance of satisfying the doctrine.
179.
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In BNY, the court acknowledged that the reason Congress created foreign
tax credits was to mitigate the problem of double taxation.186 However, as
illustrated in Compaq187 and IES Industries,188 under the BNY holding courts
would fail to achieve this goal.189 In Compaq, Compaq Computer was
purchasing foreign stocks on the U.S. stock exchanges using American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), which represent foreign stocks.190 Compaq
would buy the ADRs before they were set to pay out a dividend, receive the
dividend, and then immediately resell the stock.191 The result, while the stock
sold at a slightly lower price, was that Compaq used tax benefits gained from
both the tax implications of the sale and the tax implications of reporting a
capital loss to offset some of its U.S. tax liabilities.192 The lower court’s
calculation of profitability in Compaq closely resembles the method the
Second Circuit used in BNY. The lower court found that the objective prong
of the economic substance doctrine was not satisfied, because there was no
hope of the transaction being profitable.193 The lower court “assessed neither
the transaction’s pre-tax profitably nor its post-tax profitability. Instead, the
court assessed profitability by looking at the transaction after Dutch taxes had
been imposed, but before considering U.S. income tax consequences.”194
On appeal, the Compaq court relied on the persuasive precedent of IES
Industries, which had previously analyzed almost identical ADR
transactions.195 The IES Industries court held that the gross dividend (pretax) should be the indicator of whether a transaction was profitable, not the
net dividend (after-tax).196 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower
court in Compaq, and included the foreign tax credits the company received
when contemplating the transaction’s objective profitability.197 Both the
Compaq and IES Industries courts approached the argument from the point
of view of fairness.198 In Compaq, the court opined that a fair consideration
of the objective profitability of a transaction must include tax benefits’ added
value if it is going to count the foreign taxes paid against the transaction’s
profitability, using the holding from IES Industries to support its view.199
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Importantly, in Compaq, the Fifth Circuit highlighted the fact that, if the
company’s foreign tax credits were disallowed, then it would have to pay
taxes both to the Netherlands and to the United States on the same dividend
income.200 That result would blatantly contradict the base purpose of foreign
tax credits.201 However, by discounting the foreign tax credit toward the
transaction’s profitability, as well as treating the taxes that Compaq paid as
expenses, the Fifth Circuit would have stacked the deck against Compaq’s
transaction being found profitable.202 Instead, that court held that, if the
foreign taxes paid in a transaction count against its profitability, then the
foreign tax implications (i.e., tax credits) should count toward the
transaction’s profitability under economic substance scrutiny.203 Without
doing so, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Compaq, as well as IES
Industries before it, would likely have lost their challenge under economic
substance scrutiny, regardless of the fact that, if all tax implications were
counted, the transaction was profitable.204 The point of counting either all or
none of the tax implications in deducing the profitability of a transaction is
fairness. The analysis cannot be fair if the court is subtracting as much money
as it can in determining the profitability of a transaction, and thereby swaying
the inquiry strongly in favor of the IRS.
Moreover, it is important to understand that this Note’s argument can in
fact coexist with the statutory language of § 7701(o)(2)(B), which instructs
only that foreign taxes should be counted as business expenses when
calculating profitability.205 This statute is silent on whether or not the tax
implications should be considered, and this issue seems to have remained a
matter of common law.206 Thus, the Supreme Court could in fact create
precedent to this effect.
Finally, the fact that Compaq would win under this proposed rule does
not imply that BNY would also win, as the two cases are factually different.
The BNY court, by bifurcating the transaction, subtracting foreign taxes as
economic costs, and refusing to consider foreign tax effects in contemplation
of the transaction’s profitability, 207 crafted an economic substance inquiry
that unduly militates against the taxpayer. In BNY, the money that funded the
STARS transaction never actually left BNY’s hands;208 the money would
simply proceed circularly through the Trust, pay out as a dividend, and be put
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back into the Trust to generate greater tax benefits.209 In Compaq, legitimate
transactions took place outside of a closed universe inhabited by one or two
companies. Instead, Compaq traded on the open market and, in terms of gross
dividends, the transaction was in fact profitable.210
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s method of the objective economic substance
analysis, BNY’s STARS transaction would still fail, because, as multiple
courts have held, it is the overall economic effect of the transaction that
ultimately decides the economic substance inquiry.211 In BNY, even if the
court included the foreign tax credits BNY stood to receive, the transaction
would have failed under the subjective economic substance inquiry, because
the circular nature of the transaction strongly indicates that the sole motive
for the transaction was tax related. Hence, the Supreme Court should create
a common law, bright-line rule regarding the application of the economic
substance doctrine that mandates inclusion of foreign tax effects in
considering the profitability of a transaction under the doctrine.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: SUPPLEMENTING THE
COMMON LAW
At the start of its opinion in BNY, the Second Circuit took judicial notice
of the fact that the original intent of “the foreign tax credit regime was to
facilitate business abroad and foreign trade.”212 However, the court’s
application of the economic substance doctrine is likely to hinder, not
facilitate, foreign commerce. Moreover, current guidance on the
interpretation and application of the economic substance doctrine from
Congress indicates its intention was to tighten the leash on the use of doctrine,
perhaps out of a realization of its power.213 The Joint Committee on Taxation
(JCT) has remarked that the codified economic substance doctrine “is not
intended to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business transactions . . .
merely because the choice . . . is largely or entirely based on comparative tax
advantages,” including “a U.S. person’s choice [to utilize] a foreign
corporation . . . to make a foreign investment.”214 However, the true problem
lies in the courts’ application of the doctrine, not with the legislation or its

209. Id. at 110–11.
210. Compaq Comput. Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 783 (5th Cir. 2001).
211. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 576 (1978) (holding that courts should

consider the overall economic effect of the transaction); see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801
F.3d at 119.
212. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 107.
213. See Lipton, supra note 11, at 266–68 (describing the ways in which Congress is trying to
restrain the application of the economic substance doctrine throughout its new publications
regarding the doctrine).
214. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 379 (Comm. Print 2011) [hereinafter
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION].
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corresponding guidance, and it is incumbent upon the Supreme Court to
control that application so as to comport with legislative intent.
In fact, Congress invited the courts to do so by including language in the
codified doctrine deferring to the courts’ discretion in deciding whether or
not to apply the doctrine to a transaction.215 Hence, the Supreme Court must
now rule on how the courts are to apply the economic substance doctrine such
that the odds are not stacked against the taxpayer, but also such that abusive
sham transactions can be identified. Making determinations on when and
how to bifurcate transactions or whether or not to consider tax effects as profit
are both efficient methods for the Supreme Court to strike a much-needed
balance. The legislative history and intent surrounding the doctrine show that
the Supreme Court’s intervention is required to implement these measures.
First, the legislative history preceding the codification of the economic
substance doctrine points to Congress’ intention that the doctrine be used to
invalidate pervasive exploitations of existing tax loopholes, such as the
STARS structure, which are economic farces attempting to fit within formal
provisions of the Tax Code. It does not point to a desire to invalidate
transactions that comport with the statutory intent of the tax benefits. Since
1999, Congress had attempted to codify the economic substance doctrine in
approximately seventy bills before it settled on the current version.216 While
some scholars have focused on the “relevance” provision of the codified
doctrine, found at § 7701(o)(5)(C),217 it is also important to note that
Congress wanted the courts to decide how to apply the doctrine in a manner
that suits its intentions.
To this effect, in March 2011 the JCT published a report titled, “General
Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 111th Congress,” which
provides clarification on the application of the economic substance
doctrine.218 In relevant part, the JCT clarified that “the provision is not
intended to alter or supplant any other rule of law, including any commonlaw doctrine.”219 Coupled with the JCT’s comment earlier in the report that
the provision “does not change present law standards in determining when to
utilize an economic substance analysis,”220 the legislature clearly intended
that the application of the economic substance doctrine remain under the
purview of the courts. Furthermore, the JCT provided examples of “basic
business transactions” in its report that the legislature did not intend to
modify, one of which is the choice of using a foreign or domestic corporation
215. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (2012).
216. Luke, supra note 106, at 563.
217. Id. at 554–57 (arguing that the relevance provision of the codified economic substance

doctrine precludes courts from applying the doctrine to transactions that clearly comport with the
statutory intention of the tax benefits, while also allowing courts to have the final decision on
whether a transaction has economic substance).
218. EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 214, at 369–82.
219. Id. at 381.
220. Id. at 378.
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to invest in a foreign country.221 While the JCT report provides certain areas
that Congress did not intend the economic substance doctrine to affect, it
makes clear that the application of the codified doctrine is left to the courts
to decide and develop, including the issue of bifurcation for economic
substance scrutiny purposes.222
Therefore, not only did Congress itself recognize the power of the
economic substance doctrine and attempt to limit its use, but it also intended
the courts to take charge and decide how best to apply the doctrine in a
manner that does not affect legislatively intended tax benefits. However,
because the Circuits are split on the application of the doctrine,223 courts have
applied and will continue to apply the doctrine inconsistently. As evidenced
by the aforementioned issue of bifurcation, the courts must formulate a set
rule on how to frame and test transactions, so as not to treat taxpayers in one
Circuit differently than those in another.
CONCLUSION
The current application of the economic substance doctrine is
inconsistent and as such produces inconsistent rulings, which negatively
affect taxpayers who conduct business overseas and exercise their right to
reduce their own tax burdens. In BNY, the Second Circuit made two errors.
First, it improperly bifurcated the STARS transaction and allocated too much
power to the economic substance doctrine, and thus to the IRS. Second, it
erred in discounting earned tax benefits when considering the profitability of
the transaction. The court could and should have found that the STARS
transaction lacked economic substance using a less overpowering application
of the economic substance doctrine.
Moreover, in codifying the economic substance doctrine, Congress
intended the courts to decide on how to apply the doctrine such that it
comports with legislative intent. The Second Circuit failed in this regard. It
is clear, given the deep Circuit split on the issue, that the Supreme Court
should settle the split by creating bright line rules directing the courts on how
to apply the doctrine in light of these arguments. This will allow pervasive
tax-avoidance schemes to be uncovered and stopped, allow for a fair
consideration of all challenged doctrines, and prevent a windfall to the IRS.

221. Id. at 379.
222. Id. at 379–80 (stating that “the provision reiterates the present-law ability of the courts to

bifurcate a transaction in which independent activities with non-tax objectives are combined with
an unrelated item having only tax avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated
benefits”).
223. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2015) (The
Second Circuit notes that its application of the economic substance doctrine is inconsistent with
Fifth and Eighth Circuit precedent.).

2017]

Putting The Substance Back

493
Nicholas Giordano*

* B.A., Fordham University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2017. I would like
to thank the hardworking members of the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial
Law, particularly Alissa Cardillo and Jordan Meddy, for their time and hard work in preparing this
Note for publication. I would also like to thank my parents, Joann DeLeonibus and Angelo
Giordano, for their unconditional love and support.

